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Abstract
Despite the many uncertainties of life in cities, promises of economic prosperity, social mobility
and happiness have fuelled the imagination of generations of urban migrants in search of a better
life. Access to jobs, housing and amenities, and fewer restrictions of personal choices are some of
the perceived advantages of cities, characterised here as ‘urban promises’. But while discourses
celebrating the triumph of cities became increasingly common, urban rewards are not available
everywhere and for everyone. Alongside opportunity, cities offer inequality, conflict and poor liv-
ing conditions. Their narrative of promise has been persistent across different times and places,
but the outcomes and experiences of urban life compare poorly with the overoptimistic expecta-
tions of many newcomers. And yet, millions still come and stay regardless of odds, raising the
question why we have such positive and persistent expectations about cities. To examine this
question, this paper considers the process of urban migration from the perspective of decision-
making under uncertainty. It discusses how decisions and evaluations are based on imperfect
information and offers a novel contribution by examining how the cognitive biases and heuristics
which restrict human rationality shape our responses to urban promises. This approach may
allow a better understanding of how people make decisions regarding urban migration, how they
perceive their urban experiences and evaluate their life stories. We consider the prospects and
limitations of the behavioural approach and discuss how biases favouring narratives of bright
urban futures can be exploited by ‘triumphalist’ accounts of cities which neglect their embedded
injustices.
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‘. And by the way, the man who told
That London’s streets were paved with gold
Was telling dreadful porky-pies’.
(That’s cockney rhyming slang for lies.)
The cat went on, ‘To me it seems
These streets are paved with rotten dreams.
Come home, my boy, without more fuss.
This lousy town’s no place for us.’
(Roald Dahl, ‘Dick Whittington and His
Cat’, 1989)
Introduction
For centuries, people have been flocking to
cities in search of a better life. Despite their
changing fortunes over time, big cities have
always been perceived as the places to go
to for jobs, amenities, socio-economic
mobility, freedom and happiness. Whatever
their background, people could reinvent
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themselves anew by moving to the city and
abandoning the social constraints of their
original milieu (Yamagishi et al., 2012).
There they would also enjoy the economic
externalities triggered by the urban environ-
ment and step on the escalator of accelerated
upward mobility (Fielding, 1992; Glaeser,
2011). Together, these perceived advantages
of cities build a set of expectations which we
characterise as ‘urban promises’.
However, bright city lights can dazzle as
well as illuminate. There is ample evidence
showing that the urban escalator is not avail-
able everywhere and for everyone. While the
potential aggregate economic benefits of
urban agglomeration are evident across dif-
ferent periods and places, the outcomes for
individuals are extremely diversified. Some
receive disproportionally high rewards from
urban life, but cities turn out to be disap-
pointing for many hopeful migrants, causes
ranging from illness, social collapse and pov-
erty in the industrial cities of the past, to
congestion, un(der)employment, pollution,
loneliness, socio-ethnic conflict and inequal-
ity in today’s advanced capitalist cities
(Davis, 2006; Florida, 2017; UN-Habitat,
2016).
Such evidence has substantiated the
notion that cities are places of inequality
and that their aggregate positive impacts on
human life have their fair share of winners
and losers. And yet, even if reality does not
hold up to expectations, the overwhelming
belief by newcomers that cities will bring
them a better future persists. Millions still
come to cities facing unknown odds and stay
despite negative experiences, from migration
streams from developing countries looking
for economic opportunity to young, edu-
cated migrants hoping for career advance-
ment and self-realisation (King et al., 2018).
However, both the objective socioeconomic
outcomes and the subjective experiences of
urban life tend to compare poorly with the
overoptimistic expectations of many urban
migrants (Knight and Gunatilaka, 2010;
Williams and Donald, 2011). Cities have
indeed shown a remarkable attractive force
throughout history, which raises the ques-
tion why so many people have such positive,
persistent and possibly overrated expecta-
tions about them.
A cognitive science perspective
A substantial amount of research has exam-
ined the cognitive mechanisms shaping the
spatial preferences of individuals and influ-
encing their consequent location decisions,
perceptions and judgement of experiences
(Gould and White, 1986; Harvey, 1970;
Meester and Pellenbarg, 2006; Oishi, 2010;
Pred, 1967). This literature has confronted
assumptions of urban migration as a rational
choice, based on an objective assessment of
costs and benefits and an informed anticipa-
tion of the future. On the contrary, the con-
struction of our spatial preferences –
including those attracting us to cities and
nudging us to stay in cities – can be inter-
preted as the product of decision-making
under uncertainty, based on imperfect infor-
mation, shaped by individual perceptions,
values and desires, and relying on many con-
tingent, non-economic factors. Research
integrating these ideas develops concepts
such as bounded rationality or satisficing
behaviours, as derived from Herbert Simon’s
work (1955, 1957, 1959).
The behavioural approach has influenced
many disciplines, most prominently econom-
ics. However, its application to urban migra-
tion studies is challenging. Behavioural
analyses of spatial dynamics are too indivi-
dualised to make useful predictions and dis-
regard wider social forces which constrain
individuals regardless of their cognitive pro-
cesses (Hayter and Watts, 1983; Meester and
Pellenbarg, 2006; Sayer, 1982). As a result,
‘behavioural urban geography’ is no longer
prominent among scholars and explanations
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for urban attractiveness have shifted to
rational choice models based on the eco-
nomic opportunity paradigm, leaving the
alternative perspective ‘dead and forgotten’
(Meester and Pellenbarg, 2006: 365). This
has reduced our ability to support research
with realistic models of human behaviour,
departing from normative economic assump-
tions (Harvey, 1970) and building on the
success of the behavioural approach in other
fields.
Reinstating that perspective is timely and
relevant for two reasons. First, because the
shift to rationality in research comes hand in
hand with recent scholarly and popular texts
celebrating the potential of ‘humanity’s
greatest invention’ and the ‘triumph’ of the
city, a trend aptly named ‘urban triumphal-
ism’, among a variety of similar designa-
tions. This work stresses the apparent ability
of urban environments to offer a ‘richer,
smarter, greener, healthier and happier’ life
(Glaeser, 2011), providing opportunity for
all. But the narrative of urban triumphalism
is contested because of its focus on economic
factors to measure quality of life and explain
choices, modelling of individuals as empow-
ered rational agents pursuing opportunities,
and consequent use by policymakers to jus-
tify the reduction of public intervention in
cities and the neglect of urban injustices
(Amin, 2013; Gleeson, 2012; Nicholls, 2011;
Okulicz-Kozaryn, 2015; Peck, 2016).
Second, because cognitive scientists have
been working on models of decision-making
based on a number of cognitive biases and
heuristics, which explain the way individuals
anticipate the future, make decisions, per-
ceive their experiences and judge their out-
comes. The novel contribution of this paper
is exploring this framework to understand
the expectations, decisions, perceptions and
judgements of the urban experience, under
the hypothesis that the mechanisms shaping
these processes are strongly influenced by
the same cognitive biases that affect other
types of decision-making. Examples of such
biases are our lack of statistical intuition to
evaluate risk, generalisation of exceptional
cases, overconfidence about ourselves and
our ability to control our environment, illu-
sory cause–effect attributions and rationali-
sations of failures. Psychological literature
shows that these restrict our capacity to
make judgements about the future, the self
and the world, as well as to fairly evaluate
ongoing and past trajectories (Kahneman,
2003, 2011; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1971).
Bringing ideas from cognitive science
into urban studies is not new, and such
studies are common in environmental psy-
chology and urban design journals.
However, since the heyday of behavioural
decision-making models in the 1970s and
early 1980s, these ideas have mostly been
used to understand perception rather than
cognition – for instance, perceptions of dif-
ferent areas of the city, responses to the
built environment, cultural familiarity
enabling socio-ethnic clusters in cities, etc.
Departing from that tradition, this paper
offers new insights by directly interrogating
the field of cognitive biases and heuristics
and its potential to explain the mechanisms
of anticipation, decision-making and jud-
gement involving urban migration and the
urban experience.
Research potential
The behavioural perspective claims that
depending on the tractability of the problem
and the imponderability of the future,
humans are neither capable of optimal
decision-making nor of unbiased assess-
ments of the future, their environment and
themselves. Precisely because it is so com-
plex and unpredictable, urban life illustrates
that kind of problem. Exploring how the
enduring attractiveness of cities as well as
the penetration of positive messages about
cities are supported by cognitive biases
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provides another way to interpret the human
response to cities, including their ability to
retain even those people whose hopes and
dreams have not been fulfilled. This helps
shed light on several relevant issues for pol-
icy and research:
 The reasons for the consistent attractive-
ness of large cities throughout history,
despite their varying socioeconomic
prospects and living conditions.
 How a risky and uncertain enterprise
such as moving to the city makes people
overcome their preferred state of staying
in a familiar place (Morrison and Clark,
2016), even if basing their decisions on
contingent information.
 Whether people continually realign the
reference point used to evaluate their life
trajectory and therefore risk accommo-
dating to disappointing living conditions
mitigated by permanently deferred
expectations.
 Whether, in response, urban policies act
on hopes and dreams rather than actual
contexts and opportunities, considering
that people are more willing to accept
inequalities if they believe in their own
chances of success (Davidai and
Gilovich, 2015).
 How one-sided, overoptimistic messages
in ‘urban triumphalist’ discourses can
exploit our cognitive predispositions, to
better spread their powerful narratives
and obscure how fairly cities are deliver-
ing to citizens.
While this perspective is valid for any
kind of migration, we focus on migration to
large cities, first, because of its global magni-
tude and potential social and environmental
implications. Second, owing to the salience
of the ‘urban triumph’ story in recent years
and its association with the largest cities.
We proceed by reviewing evidence about
the impacts of urban life on groups and
individuals. Then we examine the cognitive
biases embedded in decision-making under
uncertainty and connect them to the ratio-
nale under which cities are conceived as sites
of promise and prosperity. The arguments
apply to contexts where people have reason-
able options available, rather than to
extreme situations across the globe where
cities are an escape from hunger, war or per-
secution, where other decision-making
mechanisms related to survival certainly pre-
vail. We conclude by discussing how the
incorporation of this perspective can be pro-
ductive for research and assess the implica-
tions of either exploiting our cognitive biases
to fuel narratives about urban triumphs or
acknowledging them to enable more critical
participants in urban life.
Examining urban promises
Cities are places of inequality. Even a self-
proclaimed ‘urban optimist’ such as Richard
Florida (2017) now concedes that the pro-
mises of cities have failed too many people
and that their ‘winner-take-all’ measure of
success plants the seeds of more inequality
and segregation. Moreover, ‘the larger, den-
ser and more knowledge-intensive and tech-
based a city or metro is, the more unequal it
tends to be’ (Florida, 2017: 82). In developed
countries, this is partly explained by the
combination of the availability of high-end
jobs for the most skilled workers and the
high levels of competition between them,
increasing the risk of failure (Behrens and
Robert-Nicoud, 2014). In much of the devel-
oping world, this is aggravated by poor
urban governance, derelict infrastructure
and lack of legal and social protection for
citizens, especially migrants (IOM, 2015).
Overall, cities provide high rewards for the
most able workers and privileged groups,
but may be a source of disappointment for
the less talented or less privileged.
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While cities have historically been mag-
nets for people, a scalar shift happened after
the industrial age. In previous economic
regimes, most people were bounded to spe-
cific places (by feudalist relations, agricul-
ture, or lack of connective infrastructure).
Industrialisation marked the end of place-
boundedness, and its uneven geographic dis-
tribution caused massive migration. Rural–
urban migration in Britain following early
industrialisation has been studied in detail
by Long (2005). He found that the move to
urban areas was generally not triggered by
famine or poverty, but by an expectation of
opportunities for socioeconomic improve-
ment, thereby escaping an inherited inter-
generational trajectory with little promise in
the countryside. This migration was selec-
tive, in the sense that urban migrants were
the most skilled and entrepreneurial of the
rural labour pool. As a result, those who
migrated to cities fared better: ‘On average,
people from all socio-economic strata who
moved to the city were substantially more
successful in improving their socio-economic
status than they would have been had they
remained in rural areas’ (Long, 2005: 29).
And yet, Long’s statistics are limited to
those who managed to survive the 30-year
period between the 1851 and 1881 censuses,
which he used for comparison. In reality,
urban mortality rates were up to 50% higher
than in rural areas, and urban life expec-
tancy was about 10 years lower, and even
worse in the largest cities, which kept grow-
ing only because of massive inward migra-
tion (Haines, 2001). This state of affairs
persisted until the 1930s. The costs of living
in cities were high, as famously illustrated by
Friedrich Engels, describing Manchester’s
squalor as ‘hell upon earth’. But while social
scientists and activists worked to mitigate
the problems of urban living, stressing the
economic opportunity argument was in the
interest of an urban elite who fuelled the nar-
rative of promise to attract more labour
force (Ross, 2013). The emerging picture is
one of contrast between the economic oppor-
tunity offered by cities to some and the nega-
tive social and health impacts that made the
urban experience troublesome for many.
Escalators up. and down (and with
limited capacity)
The upward mobility effect of moving to cit-
ies is known as the ‘escalator effect’, and
‘escalator regions’ (Fielding, 1992) are those
that propel the careers of migrants upward,
with the associated benefit of higher wages
leading to a higher socioeconomic status.
There is a beneficial impact on wages of
moving into cities, although partially offset
by higher living costs (Glaeser and Mare´,
2001). This premium also relates to the fact
that people with higher skills tend to sort
into big cities, a cohort that would have
experienced a rapid increase in income or
occupational attainment in the first years
anyway (van Ham, 2001; van Ham et al.,
2012).
Talented migrants may indeed advance
faster in an urban environment that lets
them develop their human and social capital,
by having access to learning opportunities,
acquiring tacit knowledge and frequently
changing jobs, enabling even more and more
diversified tacit knowledge. Nevertheless,
Gordon (2015) emphasises that this is not an
‘effortless ride up’: ambition and learning
skills are key intermediating variables deter-
mining whether one exploits the potential
gains of an escalator region. Moreover, the
link between long-term economic status and
urbanisation has been contested in some
cases: in a spatial analysis of the odds of
intergenerational economic mobility in the
USA, Chetty et al. write that ‘urban areas
tend to exhibit lower levels of intergenera-
tional mobility than rural areas’ (Chetty
et al., 2014: 1593). Finally, a large part of
urban migration comes from abroad, in
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which case other hurdles exist, even for the
young and educated: language and barriers
to employment lead to initial jobs below
their skill level and allow a relatively slow
progression (Parutis, 2011). It follows that
the urban escalator has limited capacity and
is often inaccessible. Furthermore, it cannot
be found everywhere: only a select class of
metropolitan area functions as an escalator
region (Champion et al., 2014).
The quality of life in cities has improved
considerably over the past decades, certainly
in developed countries. But other problems
persist: residents of large cities compared
with small towns and rural areas experience
more traffic congestion (Broersma and Van
Dijk, 2008) and pollution (Burgalassi and
Luzzati, 2015), are more exposed to infec-
tious diseases (Alirol et al., 2011), suffer
greater social isolation (Scharf and DeJong
Gierveld, 2008), and, especially in Western
Europe and North America, report lower
levels of subjective wellbeing, despite greater
material wealth (Berry and Okulicz-
Kozaryn, 2011; Lenzi and Perucca, 2018).
Foreign-born urban migrants may addi-
tionally experience exclusion and social vul-
nerability. The World Migration Report
states that ‘migrants, and in particular recent
migrants, [.] tend to be disproportionately
represented among the poor and vulnerable
of urban populations in both developed and
developing countries’ (IOM, 2015: 79). This
is not limited to fast-growing cities in low-
or middle-income countries: Eurostat statis-
tics (2017) show that foreign urban migrants
in the EU are more likely than natives to live
in overcrowded lodgings and be overbur-
dened by housing costs. OECD (2016) data
for Sweden show that employment rates of
foreign-born migrants are lower than those
of natives at all skill levels, partly because
the largest cities with more work opportuni-
ties also face housing shortages and afford-
ability crises, which affect migrants to a
greater degree.
All these risks are poorly anticipated
when making a residential location decision,
and may offset the benefits of moving to
and living in cities. Interestingly, the data set
by Chetty et al. (2014) mentioned earlier also
shows no positive correlation between
greater odds of intergenerational mobility
and recent population changes (based on US
Census 2000–2010 data), meaning that peo-
ple are not necessarily migrating ‘rationally’
to the places where economic opportunities
(at least for their children) are better.
Motives for migration vary, and economic
factors are filtered by individual perceptions
and intertwined with non-economic issues,
such as family, amenities, lifestyle and hous-
ing needs (Clark and Maas, 2015). It follows
that transitory interests, errors of judgement
and irrational decisions play a role in spatial
location outcomes, and this is where cogni-
tive biases may give the urban narrative its
competitive advantage. Indeed, any histori-
cal overview of the rapid growth of the larg-
est cities suggests that they were experienced
as dirty, crowded and poor, but also
expected to be rich in opportunity (Williams
and Donald, 2011). In this gap between the
expected and the experienced lies the
strength of urban promises, but also their
pitfalls, as the downsides of urban life are
neglected. This paper offers a new interpre-
tation of this asymmetry by examining what
psychological mechanisms individuals
deploy to anticipate the future, choose
between scenarios, perceive ongoing experi-
ences and report on past trajectories.
Understanding the psychology
of urban promises
As Okulicz-Kozaryn and Valente (2018)
write, ‘[A]lthough in many ways the city pro-
vides many freedoms to urbanites, it also
entraps them in city dreams and illusions’
(2018: 1). The powerful attractive force of
cities and their associated rhetoric is based
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not only on what cities can actually offer but
also on what people believe they can offer.
As many psychological studies have shown,
most decisions in life are actually made
according to the latter (Kahneman, 2011). In
complex environments, the fact that out-
comes do not mirror initial expectations is
unremarkable, and in many situations of
daily life such discrepancies go unnoticed.
What turns the case of urban promises into
more than a trivial matter is that it seems to
be an especially strong manifestation of this
phenomenon, in its persistence over time,
geographical scope and impact on human
life. Indeed, Mulchany and Kollamparambil
(2016) write that the significant decrease of
subjective wellbeing among many rural–
urban migrants may be a result of overopti-
mistic expectations which failed to realise.
Morrison and Clark (2016) use psychologi-
cal theories on loss aversion and risk assess-
ment to argue that the preferred state in
humans is staying in familiar settings, not
moving. The incentive to alter that state
must be more than trivial and involve the
expectation of substantial relative advan-
tages, otherwise migration would be less
common.
Cognitive biases and the attractiveness of
the uncertain
To understand the mental processes through
which urban promises are perceived and
acted upon by individuals, we build on the-
ories about decision-making under uncer-
tainty, pioneered by Herbert Simon, Amos
Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, and others.
These authors expand the notion of bounded
rationality to investigate how individuals
interact with the social world around them.
The nature of their assessments and deci-
sions is shaped by several consistent biases,
which, for the purposes of our argument, we
organise in two categories: (1) unrealistic
perceptions of risk, the self and the
environment, and (2) rationalisations of fail-
ure. We will refer to the biases emerging
from these categories, illustrate them from
the perspective of urban experiences, and
then go over the ways in which they can be
advertently or inadvertently induced.
Figure 1 presents a scheme of the relevant
cognitive mechanisms. It differentiates
between, first, the basic cognitive biases we
experience, and then the heuristics, or men-
tal shortcuts, that primarily enable them.
We include some arrows in the scheme to
highlight this interaction.
Unrealistic perceptions of risk, environment and
the self. Unrealistic expectations and poor
perception of risk often conflate to influ-
ence decisions in a variety of areas. For
instance, Simon et al. (2000) have demon-
strated that what drives so many individu-
als to start business ventures with little
chances of success (the so-called ‘entrepre-
neurs’) is not their propensity to accept
high risks but their lack of perception of
risk. At the initial stages, they base their
decisions on the ‘law of small numbers’
(Kahneman, 2003; Taylor and Brown,
1988; Tversky and Kahneman, 1971), a
tendency to fallaciously generalise from
sparse data and to be insensitive to sample
size – we tend to find patterns and stories,
especially those that confirm our values
and desires, in very small samples, neglect-
ing randomness and representativeness.
If migration to cities is similarly seen as a
life-changing venture of uncertain outcome,
the adherence to that endeavour is also
likely to be explained by a law of small num-
bers. Despite positive aggregate effects, the
fact that urban migration is risky for indi-
viduals has been extensively documented.
However, anecdotal evidence about a distant
acquaintance who achieved success after
moving to the city may be enough to send
others down the same path, in an expanded
version of chain migration not restricted to
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family and close friends. Taleb (2005) points
out our ‘survivorship bias’, the tendency to
select the stories of winners to inspire our
actions but disregard the vast number of
losers. Narratives about urban opportunity
cherry-pick examples of success with ‘no
particular care for audit by numbers, or
more accurately, behind the statistics of
absolute and relative poverty, it finds
context-specific place biographies and com-
plex ethnographies of being and becoming’
(Amin, 2013: 480). Cities with a substantial
density of such stories associated with them
can benefit from an ‘attractiveness bonus’,
even if they are the most saturated and com-
petitive places where the chances for individ-
ual success may actually be lower.
The poor measurement of risk coming
from weak statistical intuition coexists with
a tendency for overconfidence, which relies
on two further biases: the illusion of control
and overly positive self-assessments. Simon
et al. (2000) also argue that individuals ven-
turing into business assume they have much
greater control over their environment than
they actually do, neglecting the role of
chance and the impact of unexpected events
(Taleb, 2007; Taylor and Brown, 1988). The
illusion of control adds causality to random
events and retrospectively explains outcomes
by reconstructing the actions which appar-
ently led to them, overestimating the instru-
mental role of agents (Miller and Ross,
1975) or fetishising a specific event which
people believe to have controlled for their
benefit. According to McGee (2005), this is
the strategy of self-help books: readers who
achieved a desired outcome reconstruct the
choices they made in such a way that they
can attribute their success to their actions in
response to the book, thus justifying their
investment.
Similarly, in an environment saturated
with positive messages about urban
Figure 1. Unrealistic perceptions of risk, environment and the self.
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opportunity and individual empowerment
(which often remind us of the rhetoric of
self-help books) it is easy to reconstruct past
or ongoing life stories to reflect the illusion
of control over external events, and recog-
nise causalities that confirm the ‘natural
powers’ of cities to improve our lives –
another form of (spatial) fetishism. Forces
emanating from the spatial opportunity
structure of cities (Galster and Killen, 1995)
are thus overweighed, assuming our ability
to control them in our favour, while the
uneven distribution of personal skills and
social safety nets, or simple luck, are
neglected. These deterministic assumptions
often appear in the urban triumphalism nar-
rative (Gleeson, 2012), suggesting that
enabling the illusion of control may partly
support its attractiveness and penetration.
The overly optimistic self-assessment bias
plays a role in this imbalance. Surveys show
that most people believe they have better
qualities and future prospects than most
other people, a tendency known as the
‘better-than-average’ effect (Alicke and
Govorun, 2005). Despite the logical incon-
sistency of these assessments, they are seen
as adaptive strategies that improve mental
health, strengthening motivation and pro-
tecting us from pessimism (Taylor and
Brown, 1988). For psychologists, the overes-
timation of the likelihood of success in spite
of contrary signals follows the ‘smoke detec-
tor’ principle, which posits that the cost of
responding to a false alarm is low compared
with not acting on a real threat. Haselton
and Nettle (2006) explain that if the cost of
failure is low compared with the cost of
missing a real opportunity of gain, people
taking decisions under uncertainty will
embark on potentially promising endeavours
even if the chances of success are low.
If the attractiveness of urban migration
can be framed partly as an outcome of
overly optimistic self-assessments, then we
should consider whether something akin to
this smoke detector principle applies there:
is the cost of failure low in comparison with
the potential opportunity? How much does
the sheer increase of competitive actors and
the unevenness of the playing field affect the
level of opportunity? How much is the emo-
tional and social cost of migration compen-
sated for by economic benefits?
The interesting point is that, later, the jud-
gement of outcomes may indeed confirm the
initial expectations: Engelhardt and Wagener
(2014) have studied the gaps between actual
and perceived upward economic mobility in
26 OECD countries, in terms of job status
and material wellbeing, to find that the per-
ceived mobility of individuals is higher than
reality in every case. Surveys by Hagerty
(2003) stress this positive bias: most people
believe their lives have improved over time,
but think that the life of the average person
has not. Overoptimistic self-assessments may
embolden us and lead to positive outcomes
but they also introduce great unreliability in
self-reported life situations. As to the poten-
tial benefits of urban migration, this means
that the urban escalator may be only avail-
able for some, but everyone tends to believe
it will include or has included them. And yet,
despite the popularisation of optimistic
views, this discussion is far from settled. In
many cases, urban migration replaces one set
of risks with another. People are right about
the unmatched opportunity of cities, but
poor perception of risk, overconfidence and
the illusion of control might make them dis-
regard the unrelenting competition and injus-
tice embedded in it.
Rationalisations of failure. Cognitive biases
strongly influence the expectations and deci-
sions of individuals considering urban
migration. But why do people stay even in
the face of negative experiences and failed
expectations? The costs of failure are diffi-
cult to measure because they are often ratio-
nalised in a self-illusory way, to protect self-
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esteem and motivate us to try again (Polivy
and Herman, 2002). This cognitive bias is
known as sunk-cost fallacy, or escalation of
commitment. Several competing theories
explain it (see a review in Brockner, 1992;
also Kahneman, 2011), but the basic idea is
that people are unwilling to change a failing
course of action if they have already invested
substantial resources in it (financial, emo-
tional, timewise), either because of the need
of self-justification or because of the antici-
pation of substantial losses. The rationalisa-
tion of failure, shifting responsibility to
external events, serves as a motivation to
keep the commitment.
The paradox is that overly ambitious pur-
poses demand overly ambitious investments,
becoming simultaneously more difficult to
attain and less likely to be abandoned.
Similarly, the great promises of cities, as
shaped collectively by generations of
migrants, make them seem more attractive
than an unbiased account of urban life. But
the greater the magnitude of these promises,
the more unattainable they become for
most; and rather than giving up, this actu-
ally makes people more likely to rationalise
failure and try again.
Can this mechanism be behind the visible
capacity of cities not only to attract people,
but also to retain those who were left at the
lower steps of the urban escalator? There are
numerous examples of resilient communities
staying and persevering in decaying city
economies, such as in Detroit. Probable
explanations for this involve the natural ten-
dency to remain in familiar contexts and loy-
alty to place (King, 2004). However, the
cognitive biases perspective offers another
interpretation. It suggests that successive
failures are prone to escalate commitment
and retain people in cycles of motivation and
frustration as they keep trying, rather than
to make them abandon their investment.
The implication is that people may decide
against their own economic best interest.
Haartsen and Thissen (2014: 89) write
that the alternative, return migration, is
often perceived as failure, and ‘because they
failed in the destination, failure returnees are
thought to have inferior human and social
capital and will therefore not be able to have
any (positive) impact on the development of
the region of origin’. Many returns are
planned and socially well-regarded
(Newbold and Bell, 2001), and intended
‘successful’ return justifies keeping close ties
with the location of origin (Stark, 1991).
However, there is evidence for a negative
selection bias in return migration, namely
when purely economic factors are considered
(Niedomysl and Amcoff, 2011). In those
cases, those who do not step up the escalator
but stay and insist, even if objectively worse
off, keep their condition hidden from social
disdain and can hope for their own lucky
moment.
(Self-)inducing cognitive biases
Psychologists and behavioural economists
see the biases of poor perception of risk, illu-
sions of control, overly optimistic self-
assessments, and rationalisation of failure as
design features of human cognition rather
than flaws that can be corrected (Haselton
and Nettle, 2006). However, Kahneman
(2011) argues that we can mitigate the nega-
tive consequences of these cognitive limita-
tions by becoming more aware of the ways
in which they can be induced and exploited.
We will refer to three main ‘cognitive short-
cuts’ used as heuristics to support decision-
making: framing, the way that gains and
losses are presented; accessibility, the ease
with which thoughts are recalled; and focus-
ing illusions, the errors in judging the weight
of especially visible distinctions (see Figure 1
for their connection with cognitive biases).
All these enablers of biases can be recog-
nised, explicitly or implicitly, in current
understandings of cities.
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Framing. Framing effects (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981) violate the rationalist
assumption that the addition of irrelevant
features or outcome differences does not
affect decision-making. In fact, logically
equivalent assertions result in very different
perceptions depending on how they are pre-
sented (a treatment presented as having a
10% mortality rate is likely to be less
favoured than one with 90% survival rate;
see Kahneman, 2003). This not only lets
individuals reinvent their own narratives
about urban promises to better confirm their
desires and beliefs, but also allows city
authorities and opinion-makers to frame
information in different ways according to
the effect they wish to create. For instance,
investment agencies highlight the numbers
that show the positives of their cities, but
not those that may reveal negative features;
municipalities frame gentrification as ‘regen-
eration’ to create a positive response in visi-
tors and investors.
Cities have used framing techniques to
position themselves under a positive light for
centuries, a common trend known as urban
boosterism. But framing can have a more
pervasive use, namely to make claims about
urban life in general rather than particular
cities. Leaving aside the discussion about
supporting evidence, see how Glaeser (2011)
reframes the problem of concentrated urban
poverty by implying that cities are ‘good
places to be poor’ and thus attract more
poor people (Peck, 2016). Amin adds that
popular urban imaginaries reframe slums as
‘another kind of creative/resilient
Schumpeterian space’ (Amin, 2013: 479), full
of opportunity and empowerment, while
implicitly endorsing the neglect of public
intervention in the city. This use of framing
helps create generalisable stories, regardless
of context. Later they become accessible
simplifications, which we value more than
evidence for decision-making. That is how
the next heuristic, accessibility, works.
Accessibility. Urban imaginaries often rely on
very rich descriptions, visually striking
images and memorable concepts. From the
first suburbs and Garden Cities to present
urban regeneration projects, developers
advertise their new ventures with detailed
imagery and descriptions to trigger strong
reactions and easily recallable memories.
The reason why they do this illustrates the
phenomenon of accessibility: when con-
fronted with a question about which we do
not have sufficient information – such as
what will life in the city be like? – we tend to
replace it with a secondary question to
which we can respond easily – such as do I
feel attracted to this promise? In decision-
making, the ease of recollection and salience
of the data are more important than their
statistical representativeness (Kahneman,
2011; recall the law of small numbers).
The capacities to surprise, alter moods
and evoke familiar stereotypes are attributes
that enhance accessibility (Higgins, 1996;
Kahneman, 2003). Therefore, rhetorically
effective discourses about the promises of
cities, rich in imagery and resorting to spe-
cific anecdotes, are likely to override other,
eventually more balanced, sources of infor-
mation. Urban promises have been present
in films, popular music and other forms of
art and media, and this is likely to have
helped the accumulation of simplified, sali-
ent and biased messages which are part of
our cognitive associations with the idea of
the city: in some sense, successive replica-
tions and modernisations of the Stadtluft
macht frei motto turn it into a ‘meme’, a
carrier of cultural ideas which transmits
across generations (Dawkins, 1976). And
yet, to be fair, the reliance on accessibility
works both ways, as the literature about the
negative side of urban life, which occupied
part of the 20th century, resorted perhaps
even more to highly recallable and strong
imagery about dystopia and conflict to make
its points.
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Focusing illusions. A well-known illustration
of the final bias, the focusing illusion,
involves precisely the perceived distinction
between two spatial locations, which relates
nicely to the argument about how people
judge the promises of urban life. Schkade
and Kahneman (1998) compared how peo-
ple living in the Midwest (USA) judged their
own life satisfaction and that of people liv-
ing in California, and vice versa. While the
average satisfaction was similar in both
places, Midwesterners assumed that life
satisfaction in California was higher, based
on the better weather as a highly salient dis-
tinction, which they overweighed relative to
the rest. The authors write that the correla-
tion between subjective wellbeing factors
and objective life circumstances is very low,
but ‘judgements of life satisfaction in a dif-
ferent location are susceptible to a focusing
illusion: easily observed and distinctive dif-
ferences between locations are given more
weight in such judgements than they will
have in reality’ (Schkade and Kahneman,
1998: 340). Under this perception, people
might indeed move to California ‘in the mis-
taken belief that this would make them hap-
pier’ (Schkade and Kahneman, 1998: 345).
While the weather is a secondary factor,
what counts is how much it sets a difference
from the present situation of the observer.
Messages highlighting salient distinctions
between alternative places can exploit the
focusing illusion to induce life-changing
decisions. Urban promises thrive on such
illusions: visible differences between large
cities and the original settings of migrants –
whether they focus on access to amenities
and jobs, finding potential love partners, or
enjoying the cultural milieu – will be greatly
overweighed as to their potential for change
and role in future life satisfaction. The
greater the difference, the greater the error
of judgement, meaning that the focusing illu-
sion is more likely to affect people choosing
between very distinct environments (say,
London and a village in southern Italy),
than those opting between two more similar
places.
The point that what counts is not the
actual factor of satisfaction but the change it
implies in comparison with current condi-
tions suggests that cognitive biases can pro-
duce similar discrepancies between
expectations and outcomes across all types
of social groups. There is a whole spectrum
of urban migrants, from underprivileged
populations going to cities in search of a bet-
ter life to skilled professionals looking for
the next career move. But, excluding situa-
tions of absolute need to migrate, whatever
the odds, the differences in the mental pro-
cesses used by these groups to perceive and
act upon urban promises may be in degree
rather than nature. Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) developed prospect theory around the
notion that the actual carriers of utility are
not expected states of wealth but the poten-
tial gains and losses in relation to a point of
reference. This reference dependence sug-
gests that people in all kinds of initial states
may fall for the same type of judgement
errors and similarly overrate urban pro-
mises. All will require the anticipation of a
significant amount of relative change to cur-
rent conditions to overcome loss aversion
and engage in the risky enterprise of urban
migration (Morrison and Clark, 2016).
Nevertheless, qualified professionals are
likely to have more measurable expectations,
such as education or a new job. For under-
privileged people, on the other hand, not
only will the lower reference point facilitate
the illusion of greater relative changes, but
the move to the city may also be more
clouded with uncertainty about the future,
adding difficulty to their decisions and
exacerbating the potentially negative impacts
of wrong choices.
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Summary and discussion
Urban promises have fuelled the imagina-
tion of generations of hopeful migrants, who
have often exaggerated the potential benefits
and neglected the drawbacks of cities. The
way this tendency has endured throughout
history, in many different contexts, makes
an explanation deeply embedded in the
human psyche quite likely. This paper used
insights from cognitive science to better
understand why people tend to have strong
and positive expectations about cities, even
in the face of uncertain odds, contradicting
facts and negative experiences. It discussed
urban migration as a form of decision-
making under uncertainty and provided a
novel contribution by using the framework
of cognitive biases and heuristics, popu-
larised by Daniel Kahneman and others in
various fields of sociology and economics, to
explore the psychological mechanisms affect-
ing how we understand and act upon urban
promises. In parallel, the paper aimed to elu-
cidate some of the reasons for the attractive-
ness of the ‘urban triumphalism’ discourse
and provide further directions for its cri-
tique. More broadly, it argued the impor-
tance of a behavioural approach to urban
studies to diversify current debates around
migration and urban agglomeration.
Cognitive biases provide, indeed, clues to
explore relevant urban research concerns: (1)
the poor perception of risk (law of small
numbers) explaining the exaggerated value
given to previous individual urban migration
stories; (2) the illusion of control providing
fertile ground for the rhetoric of urban tri-
umphalism and the belief in the ‘natural
powers’ of cities; (3) overoptimistic self-
assessments inducing individual trust in the
urban escalator, the neglect of playing fields
tilted by embedded injustice and competi-
tion, and making us misevaluate success; and
(4) the escalation of commitment as a factor
for the ability of cities to retain even those to
whom urban life was not yet generous.
All these biases feature prominently in
how we anticipate and perceive life in cities.
They can be strengthened by a variety of
heuristics, or cognitive shortcuts. Framing
and accessibility are common strategies to
convey positive messages about urban life
and dispel its downsides. Focusing illusions
overweigh the importance of future changes
but always relate to a point of reference,
meaning that the tendency to overrate such
changes to one’s current situation may affect
all kinds of socioeconomic groups.
Policy implications: The city as a self-help
book? Several implications of how cognitive
biases affect individuals are relevant for policy.
Recent literature has even proposed that
public policies should be formulated in a way
that builds on those biases to improve our
‘choice architecture’ and nudge us towards
healthier, more responsible and more sensible
behaviours (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).
However, acknowledging cognitive biases is
also important to mitigate their negative
impacts, namely in the case of urban migration
and urban life in general. For instance, while
ICT and social media can help support
migration decisions by providing better
information about the destination (Cooke and
Shuttleworth, 2018), thus reducing the risk of
failure, it is also true that digital connectivity
often amounts to personal information
bubbles which restrict access to balanced
information. Considering that the levels of risk
coming from acting on inaccurate information
and the potential impact of wrong decisions
vary significantly between more and less
privileged socioeconomic groups, this implies
more attention to how cognitive features can
be purposefully exploited by techniques of
manipulation of information and affect the
most vulnerable.
Cardoso et al. 465
Indeed, when it comes to the promised
triumph of the urban, there is much self-help
book-styled rhetoric promised by city mar-
keting gurus. But the logic behind self-help
books is often dangerous – they fetishise
single actions, provide immoderate hopes,
neglect that choice sets are severely limited,
and spread the idea that being poor, unsuc-
cessful, unattractive or depressed is one’s
own responsibility and can be changed by
one’s own reinvention (McGee, 2005). In a
curious analogy, much contemporary urban
policy frames the withdrawal of public inter-
vention and the neglect of collective respon-
sibility for spatial and social justice as a
‘bottom-up’ empowerment of free-choosing
citizens (Amin, 2013), similarly seen as well-
informed, resourceful and free from social
or choice constraints. Research in the USA
shows that especially the poorest individuals
are indeed willing to accept vast amounts
of inequality, as long as they believe in
the opportunity to succeed, overestimating
the likelihood of upward mobility against
the risk of downward mobility (Davidai and
Gilovich, 2015).
The exploitation of these tendencies is
patent in the futurology of some urban tri-
umphalists, announcing the natural powers
of cities to make us all happier, wealthier
and healthier. Highlighting the biases
through which we perceive the world may
help to tone down some of these celebratory,
but paralysing narratives that have spread to
policymaking and media.
Theoretical implications and limitations. We illu-
strated the discrepancy between the expected
and the experienced life in cities through
notions of bounded rationality when antici-
pating the future. However, alongside that
gap, we must consider another one between
the experienced and the perceived: even in
the presence of results, we tend to misrepre-
sent and overrate our successes, meaning
that individual idiosyncrasies and values
distort not only future expectations but also
the perceived outcomes of urban life.
Misguided perceptions even apply to ‘hard’
factors such as economic mobility
(Engelhardt and Wagener, 2014), stressing
that ‘factual’ realities are also contingent
and are apprehended through filters of emo-
tion, affect, personality, age, relative change,
among others. It is not just that our cogni-
tive abilities are limited when we are antici-
pating and deciding, but also that our (non-
cognitive) experience of reality is not objec-
tive but interpretative (Oishi, 2010).
And yet, these imperfect tools are all we
have to decide, perceive and judge life. When
it comes to assessing expectations, experi-
ences and perceptions about urban life, they
make individuals more likely to constantly
realign their reference points (Kahneman,
2011). This makes them likely to accommo-
date to disappointing but misperceived life
conditions, mitigated by constantly deferred
expectations, especially in large urban areas
where opportunities are diffuse and possibili-
ties abundant.
This presents a problem for research
interested in applying behavioural methods
to urban studies. With no objectively
reported outcomes to test our hopes and
dreams against, we end up comparing two
levels of subjectivity. The complex wash of
filters affecting the perception of experiences
introduces unreliability in typical methods
of assessment such as individual surveys or
life story interviews. Better approaches are
probably long-term longitudinal studies
comparing large data sets, which could
dilute the impact of individual unreliability,
and studies testing for differences (age,
skills, nationality, socioeconomic back-
ground, etc.) where the issue is not how peo-
ple report on their experiences but how
much subjective reports by different groups
vary on average.
Anyway, behavioural urban geography
would not be a positivist discipline able to
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generate postulates, as Harvey wondered
decades ago (1970). Its strengths are in illu-
minating differences between individuals,
times and contexts and adopting a critical
realism approach. In other words, taking the
individuality and fragmentation of explana-
tions as an assumption, the behavioural
approach operates through a retroductive
method, which, unlike other approaches,
explores not the logical or the general conclu-
sion of the analysis but the realistically ade-
quate explanation, ever provisional, mainly
asking what qualities should exist for some-
thing to be possible (Danermark et al., 2002;
Meyer and Lunnay, 2013).
The positive aspects of cities should not be
downplayed. Cities are engines of socio-
economic mobility, freedom, innovation and
quality of life. Agglomeration benefits are evi-
dent and people looking for greater life
opportunities are right to consider moving to
larger cities. Advertising their positive sides,
believing in unlikely promises and following
uncertain paths may have productive effects,
reinforcing motivation and helping overcome
reluctance to change (Berliant, 2010).
However, the question of how the ‘compara-
tive advantage’ of cities emerges can be asked
by future research. We consider two possibili-
ties: first, there are actors with an incentive to
frame cities as more attractive than they actu-
ally are. Second, there is a systematic infor-
mation asymmetry, related to the scale of
cities and the density of stories and events
that take place there, which develops into a
commonly accepted form of spatial fetishism
– things are not just in the city, they become
of the city (Saunders, 1986). This process
shifts the focus from purposeful framing to
the accessibility and focusing illusion heuris-
tics which unfold in our minds regardless of
intentions (e.g. positive stories will have
greater salience, despite representativeness;
potential changes are excessively valued).
Considering the historical persistency of
‘urban promises’, the second possibility
seems likely: the features of human cognition
process information asymmetrically and pro-
vide a comparative advantage to the urban
narrative. The question then is to make peo-
ple more aware of these features so that they
are able to critically judge the benefits and
costs of urban life, avoid one-sided or biased
discourses, and make more informed deci-
sions about their future. When it comes to
developing policies that improve urban life
for a majority of people, the belief in better
urban futures should not be appropriated as
a pretext to perpetuate spatial and socio-
economic injustices.
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